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I
You have asked for some observations on the place of legal history
in the curriculum of the law school. The more I have reflected on the
subject, the more convinced I have become that the fundamental ques-
tion is rather the place of the law school in the study of legal history.
I propose, therefore, that for a few moments at least we cease seeking
a niche for historical studies in the structure of the present law school,
and instead ask what is the spirit in which valuable historical studies
are to be pursued and what relation there is between this spirit and the
spirit of the American law school.
The present state of American studies in legal history is anything but
flourishing. In perhaps less than a dozen law schools is a course in legal
history being offered. In the whole United States, there are at the most
three or four men giving their full time, and maybe six or eight more
who give any substantial part of their time, to the history of our legal
institutions. The legal historian, as historian, is thought to be an orna-
ment rather than a prop of the law school. Usually he must earn his
right to give a small part of his time to his metier by giving the major
part of his time to, the non-janitorial chores around the law building.
If he can make himself useful enough in other ways he may be allowed
also to teach legal history. The faculty consider themselves engaged
with the real world while the historian idles in the amusing but unsub-
stantial past. If this picture is not altogether caricature, one can hardly
say that a place has been found for the historian in the scheme of the
Americaii law school. This is not the fault either of the historian or of
the other members of the law faculty; rather it is a symptom of the
spirit of the American law school.
Within the last seventy-five years that spirit has been predominantly
pragmatic. It has sometimes been obscured by sectarian controversies
within law schools; but, as often is the case, the odium of controversy
has been bitterest between those whose disagreement has been least
fundamental. The so-called revolutions in law curricula have revealed
a continuous preoccupation with "curriculum"-a preoccupation which
itself expresses the pragmatic temper. The curriculum has been dealt
with like the heating system of the law building-a contraption to be
tinkered with, modernized and improved. Law school revolutions, like
* The substance of this article was delivered as a speech by Professor Boorstin to the
Legal History and Jurisprudence Section of the Association of American Law Schools' Meet-
ing in December 1947.
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some other "revolutions" in history, have thus for the most part con-
cealed the fact that no essential change has been made.
The expression of the pragmatic spirit has had two phases. The first
phase was the origin, development and diffusion of the "case-method"
and of the prediction concept of law in its simplest form. "Law, con-
sidered as a science," Langdell explained in the preface to his influential
case-book on contracts in 1871, "consists of certain principles or doc-
trines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with
constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human af-
fairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer. .. ." It has often been noted
that the elaboration of the case-method of legal instruction occurred
simultaneously with the development of pragmatism as an explicit phi-
losophy. Despite the fact that Langdell himself was not a pragmatist,
the appeal of the case-method in the United States in the late 19th and
.early 20th century was due in large measure to its compatibility with
the prediction concept of law. "The object of our study," Justice
Holmes wrote in a familiar passage, ". . is prediction, the prediction
of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the
courts. ... Far the most important and pretty nearly the whole
meaning of every new effort of legal thought is to make these prophe-
cies more precise, and to generalize them into a thoroughly connected
system." "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and noth-
ing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." From the point
of view of such a concept of law, the case-method had obvious advan-
tages.
But even if-perhaps, especially if-one shared this emphasis on pre-
diction, the case-method of instruction would show itself to have limita-
tions. For example, the case-method over-emphasized the utility of
law reports as the raw material of prediction. Langdell himself declared
in 1886 in a passage now often quoted by his critics: "First, that law is
a science; second, that all the available materials of that science are
contained in printed books." Moreover, the case-method tended to
approach law almost exclusively from the point of view of the practis-
ing lawyer. It was preoccupied with predicting the particular decision,
with describing how the application of the public force was apt to affect
the individual client. At the same time it was never made clear just
how the student was to get from prediction in general to prediction in
particular: or from "the law" to the client. This was like claiming for
astronomy the uses of astrology without explaining precisely how the
power to predict the general movements of heavenly bodies would im-
prove one's power to predict the actual behavior of earthly creatures.
In these and other ways the case-method was inadequate to its prag-
matic aspirations. And the second phase in the expression of the prag-
matic spirit developed out of the attempt to remedy such inadequacies.
To predict what the courts would do, you needed more than reports of
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past cases-which Justice Holmes had called "the oracles of the law."
It was the growing awareness of the importance of extra-legal materials
for the attainment of pragmatic ends that led to the so-called "integra-
tion of law with the social sciences," by which the University of Chicago
Law School, for example, has characterized the curriculum which it in-
troduced about nine years ago. This second phase has expressed the
belief that a lawyer needs to know not merely the reasons which judges
give for their decisions, but the reasons which they do not give: their
education, their social and economic background, their peculiarities of
character and personality, and even something of their instincts and
of the indirect effects of their sexual drives. The lawyer, it is argued,
has to be a social scientist, simply because otherwise he will be a bad
lawyer. His predictions will be faulty unless he can calculate the prob-
able effect both of large social forces and of intimate non-rational influ-
ences on the decision of any particular case. At this stage, law teachers
still lack clarity on how to get from astronomy to astrology, from the
general to the particular prediction, but they have at least enlarged the
material which the lawyer is trained to take into account in prophesying
the fortufe of his client. The newer approach has represented a greater
concern with groups and an increasing interest in "long run" effects.
If I am not mistaken, the conception of a "policy science" now being
developed by the Yale Law School (while lacking the naivet6 of the
earlier pragmatists, and in fact expressly rejecting prediction as the ob-
ject of the curriculum) itself expresses a pragmatic emphasis. It, too,
is largely concerned with labor and management, with landlords and
tenants, with consumers, with the underprivileged and the overprivi-
leged, with prediction and control of the size, form and distribution of
the national income and the national expenditure.
These are the two phases of the pragmatic spirit which we have al-
ready witnessed. What is likely to be the next phase of its expression
in legal education is brilliantly forecast by Judge Jerome Frank in his
recent "Plea for Lawyer-Schools." ' His argument seems to me virtu-
ally unanswerable. And if, as is likely, his view gains in popularity, we
will be brought full circle in American legal education-with the law
office and the law school once again closely associated. The "advanced"
law schools of our generation are thus likely to combine training in the
skills of prediction and management for the individual client (which
will be accomplished by law office apprenticeship in addition to the
present reading of "cases and materials") with training in the skills of
prediction, management and control for interest-groups.
1. 56 YAE L. J. 1 (1947).
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II
What are likely to be the consequences of these developments for the
study of law in that broad humanistic spirit which has characterized
the writing of legal history at its best? It is a notable fact, often for-
gotten, that nearly every American contribution to legal history which
ought to be considered a classic was made before the movement toward
the so-called "integration of law with the social sciences." Holmes'
Common Law was published in 1881; Ames' Lectures on Legal History
were first delivered in 1886-7; and Thayer's Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence at the Common Law was published in 1898. While each of
these has been to some extent corrected by more recent scholarship, and
while they all left something to be desired in breadth of view or elegance
of form, nevertheless they were all works of large conception and of
scholarly integrity, in the best tradition of history as a humanistic
study. It is true that these classics were produced simultaneously with
the development of the case method. But while the case method was
a characteristically American development, such works on legal history
were not so at all, but were squarely in the German and English tradi-
tion. They were to a considerable extent stimulated by if not actually
based on the work of European historians of the 19th century. Numer-
ous factors help explain why this period saw the efflorescence of Ameri-
can legal history. Among these might be the growth of the idea of
Anglo-Saxon supremacy; and the fact that the first great development
of American legal education was in New England where there was a
strong local tradition of historical scholarship reaching back to Ban-
croft, Parkman and Prescott, and where the genteel tradition required
even lawyers to cultivate the past. The only later work which im-
presses me as belonging in this class is Professor McIlwain's High
Court of Parliament and Its Suprenzacy, which dates from 1910 and thus
still belongs to the early period.
Whatever the explanations may be, after the movement toward the
"integration of law with the social sciences" gained momentum, there
appeared hardly another work in legal history of the stature of those
mentioned. From this movement we have reaped a harvest of mono-
graphs which to be sure are useful, but which somehow lack the scope
and grandeur of conception of the greatest works of the earlier period.
This phenomenon is not entirely accidental, but can be related to the
larger historical development which I have tried to trace. In the age
of the unadulterated case-method, law professors were preoccupied with
turning the bare materials of the law reports to the purposes of a "legal
science" or a prediction of the behavior of the courts; they had little
energy or imagination left for incorporating the materials of the le-
gal past or the non-legal materials of the present into their pragmatic
scheme. But, as we have already observed, the second phase in the
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recent history of the American law school (that of integration with the
social sciences) was actually aimed at remedying this "defect"; at en-
listing the history of legal institutions, along with anthropology, psy-
chology, economics and even philosophy, in the service of its pragmatic
ends. This enlargement might in one sense have extended the vision
of legal historians-and may in the long run still somehow produce this
effect. Yet its more immediate effect has been to nourish a spirit which
is at odds with the spirit of the most important historical scholarship.
The pragmatic atmosphere has thus killed American legal history
almost before its birth. For the law school has required that the histo-
rian who would survive in its midst should justify his inquiry according
to criteria which have nothing to do with history; and in the United
States the law schools have a virtual monopoly of the teaching and
study of law. How can he contribute, the historian is asked, to explain-
ing the procedure which the practising lawyer must employ? What
"lessons" can history teach? But as Professor McIlwain has wisely re-
marked, to try to teach the lessons of history without teaching history
itself is like trying to plant cut flowers.
The so-called integration of the social sciences with the study of law
has, moreover, witnessed the decline (in so far as this has been possible)
of legal history as a recognized subject in law schools. The number of
economists, psychologists, and political scientists has grown while the
number of historians on law faculties has hardly increased at all. In
fact the University of Chicago Law School, which pioneered in the sec-
ond pragmatic phase, has recently dropped English legal history from
the list of required subjects in its four-year program. From law deans
who are dominated either by the pragmatic spirit of contemporary law
schools, or by the more pragmatically minded of their colleagues, we
hear the familiar argument that legal history is better taught not as a sep-
arate subject, but as a part of the categories of contemporary law. They
allege that, far from having ceased to teach legal history they actually
have infused it into all courses: the history of contracts being "inte-
grated" with the law of contracts, etc. This method is said to have the
pedagogical advantage of making history more "interesting" by relat-
ing it to the practical concerns of the student; but no account is taken
of the fact that most law professors have neither the knowledge nor the
vocation for historical studies. The important effect in the long run is
the swallowing up of history in the pragmatic concerns of the rest of the
law school.
So far I have used the pragmatic spirit as a way of defining how stud-
ies in legal history should not be guided. Is there an alternative, and if
so what is it? The alternative which I propose might for convenience
be called the humane study of law, to distinguish it both from the prag-
matic and from the "social science" approach. In any such discussion
as the present, of course, pragmatism has a rhetorical advantage. For
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it purports to provide concrete, definite, and above all limited objec-
tives for intellectual activities which otherwise sometimes seem discour-
agingly vague and undirected. But this rhetorical advantage is itself
a clue to the danger of allowing the pragmatic spirit to dominate legal
research: its tendency to narrow human reflection to practical and con-
temporary interests, to inhibit the exploration of the range of human
thought and experience. As Veblen remarked in his Place of Science
In Modern Civilization, the pragmatic spirit, the spirit of worldly
wisdom, of willing subservience to predominant contemporary interests,
is the great enemy of the free exercise of man's idle curiosity:
"Wisdom and proficiency of the pragmatic sort does not contribute
to the advance of a knowledge of fact. It has only an incidental
bearing on scientific research, and its bearing is chiefly that of in-
hibition and misdirection ....
". .. [The pragmatists] feel the inherent antagonism between
them and the scientists, and look with some doubt on the latter as
being merely decorative triflers, although they sometimes borrow
the prestige of the name of science-as is only good and well, since
it is of the essence of worldly wisdom to borrow anything that can
be turned to account."
This spirit, Veblen observed, tends to pervert scholarship from disin-
terested inquiry into "a taxonomy of credenda." To plead against
the pragmatic spirit in legal studies is, then, less to plead for any
particular type of studies, than to seek an atmosphere which allows
men freely to pursue all the types of studies which their intellectual
curiosity, imagination, and interests may lead them to. It is to plead
that the nature and development of legal institutions be examined in
many different ways, with the fullest regard for the complex totality of
man's past and present, material and spiritual concerns; and not with
an eye solely for the utility of such investigations for improving the
skills of the practising lawyer, or for guarding the interests of particular
clients (whether individuals or groups), or for maximizing immediate
social goods.
Such a plea, while its general validity may seem almost too obvious
to require support, is especially called for in this country. For other
deep-rooted factors have conspired with the pragmatic spirit to make
our legal studies less free, humane and cosmopolitan than they might
otherwise have been. The most obvious and most potent of these
has been that our common law is predominantly a system of case
law based on the principle of stare decisis. Since the law reports of the
past have been the main raw material from which the lawyer has
hoped to discover the legal rules of the present, this use of the docu-
ments of legal history has overshadowed all others. The utility of the
data of history for the practising lawyer, rather than stimulating an
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interest in the significance of institutions in past ages, has tended to
assimilate historical studies to the pragmatic purposes and categories
of contemp6rary legal practice. As I have tried to show elsewhere,
2
even the best English legal historians have been influenced in this direc-
tion.
Had our legal institutions been of more thoroughly native growth,
our interest in law might conceivably have led us indiscriminately into
the legal institutions of many other ages and nations. But our institu-
tional, traditional and linguistic ties with the English common law have
given us some of the satisfactions and indeed some of the values of stud-
ies in comparative law (which inevitably must be studies in comparative
legal history) while at the same time narrowly confining our compari-
sons. What I mean may be made clearer by comparing our situation
with that of those European countries, like Germany or France, which
have built their legal institutions on the Roman law. The English tradi-
tion of the common law on which we have based our legal institutions
takes us back not much more than eight or nine hundred years, all of
course within the Christian era, and in the European civilization closest
to our own. But a serious study of the development of contemporary
French or German law inevitably has carried French and German schol-
ars back over two thousand years, at least to 500 B. C., through a for-
eign language into an alien, largely pre-Christian civilization which was
itself in close touch with still more alien Near Eastern cultures. Euro-
pean students of law have profited from these larger scholarly and imag-
inative demands made of them. Either the pragmatic spirit or an over-
weening national or racial arrogance (or both) has allowed us, despite
the vast sums spent in this country on the social sciences, complacently
to ignore the other great secular legal system of modem Western civili-
zation. In this country the Roman law has not been treated, either by
legal scholars or historians, with the respect due to so impressive a
monument of Western man's attempts to order his society; the subject
has been stubbornly ignored, and Roman law is now studied here in few
places outside of Louisiana or of sectarian institutions. If primitive law
and ancient law have elicited more scholarly interest in the United
States, this may be explained largely by the fact that they have fallen
within the province of anthropologists, sociologists and students of an-
tiquity, rather than of legal scholars.
III
Before proposing specific institutional ways in which studies of the
broader type might be encouraged, I would like to suggest some kinds
of inquiry related to the law which a free atmosphere might stimulate.
Of course, one of the virtues of this freer spirit is that it will take men
2. Boorstin, Tradition and Method in Legal History, 54 HARV. L. REv. 424 (1941).
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where it may; for in every individual case such scholarship would have
an inward logic of its own. The examples I give must therefore not be
considered an agenda for scholars, but rather hints at types of inquiry
that heretofore have lacked the encouragement they deserve. Because
my own interest is mainly in history, my examples will inevitably have
an historical emphasis.
It is a commonplace that the sort of order which men have wished to
embody in their society has been related to the sort of order which they
have seen in the universe at large. This order has been enx'pressed in
their ideas of religion, science and metaphysics; at the same time the
order which they have seen in the universe has been affected by the
actual conditions of climate, geography, natural resources and social
institutions in which they have lived. Therefore we can hardly pretend
to have studied law in the context of human life until we have done our
best to relate legal institutions to man's spiritual aspirations as well as
to his material environment. Studies of law in this proper context have
been by no means unknown among scholars of ancient history. Stu-
dents of Egyptian institutions tell us that the concept of maat ("jus-
tice"; "order"; "regularity") which lay at the center of the Egyptian
conception of political order cannot be understood except in the contet.t
of religion and science. Similarly, we are told that the Mesopotamian
idea of law cannot be comprehended without some understanding of the
Mesopotamian notion of the cosmos as a state and of the gods as legis-
lators. Again, it is obvious that the Hebrew legal institutions and con-
cept of law are unintelligible without reference to religion. Attempts
to understand law among these peoples have led scholars not only into
theology, metaphysics and science, but also to the actual influences of
geography and climate; all these taken together and in relation to each
other say a great deal more than does each aspect seen separately. In
relation to Roman law such enquiry is brilliantly illustrated in the
works of von Jhering-especially his Geist des romischent Rechts auf den
verschiedenen Stufen seiner ,ntwicklung. But there has been shamefully
little exploration of the intellectual foundations and environment of the
common law, English or American. Of course, the most influential
-works of legal theory like those of Hobbes and Bentham have been at-
tempts at such exploration. Yet historians, excepting a few like Elie
Halvy-in his Growth of Philosophic Radicalism-have not shared this
catholicity. At the present time, however, with the scholarship of
Stubbs, Maitland, Vinogradoff, Holdsworth, Holmes, Ames, Thayer
and McIlwain behind us, we are admirably equipped to connect the
history of the internal development of our institutions with the whole
of man's thought and experience.
The study and writing of American legal history have, in my opinion,
been retarded more by the failure to approach them in the humane
spirit than by the scarcity or inaccessibility of documents for the earlier
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period or by the excess of more recent material. To advance our under-
standing of American legal history we should, perhaps, become philo-
sophically more ambitious and chronologically or geographically more
modest; we should focus on broader problems, though always, of course;
illustrated in the limited data of some particular time and place. The
preconception that our task is to trace the linear development of all the
topics handled by the contemporary lawyer makes our work seem hope-
less or futile. The Digest System with its 400-odd alphabetical topics
from "Abandonment" to "Workman's Compensation" may lead us into
the cases but it will never provide a framework for legal history; and
it is likely to discourage us from serious effort. Yet such an approach
is the product of allowing historical studies to be dominated by prag-
matic interests. If on the contrary, we take our stand at almost any
point in our past, and inquire into the relation between a few of the
major legal institutions of that day and the whole context of man's life,
we will have set ourselves a work at once more feasible and more signifi-
cant.
Let me illustrate. Anyone who should set himself the task of writing
the history only of the law of marriage in the United States from the
beginning and in all the jurisdictions, would doubtless be unable within
a single lifetime to encompass the relevant materials. Even should he
succeed, his product would interest few save practising lawyers; if he
were a man of great talent and industry he might produce another
Williston on Contracts. On the other hand, a careful study of even a
few legal institutions (such as marriage, contract, or the law of master
and servant) in Puritan New England (to take only one of many pos-
sibilities), in the full light of the theological and scientific ideas of that
age would have a great deal to say about the relation between thought
and institutions, and might even help recast and define the problem of
the reception of the common law in America. Or, to see the legal the-
ories and institutions of the Jeffersonian age (for example, their attitude
toward legislation) in relation to the consuming quest for a natural
order, the omnivorous interest in natural history, and the energetic
effort to conquer a continent might tell us something new and vital, not
only about the Jeffersonian tradition but about the general implications
of materialism and a naturalistic theology for legal institutions. What
preconceptions about the nature of man, of thought, of justice, and of
society have supported American movements toward codification, as
illustrated, say, in the work of Edward Livingston or of David Dudley
Field? What is the place of these movements in man's quest for cer-
tainty? We have already hinted at a study of the relation between, on
the one hand, the growth of the case-method of legal instruction and
the prediction-concept of law and on the other hand the growth of the
explicit philosophy of pragmatism and the new biology, physics and
psychology with their attendant concepts of scientific method.
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If one sets out from the material side of man's existence-that is,
less from intellectual than from social and economic history-a host of
other possibilities offer themselves. For example, what has been the
influence of the frontier, of the juxtaposition of civilization and barbar-
ism, on the concepts and institutions of law at different times and places
on this continent? In what ways does the fact that men live in an agri-
cultural, a ranching, or a mining community affect their concepts of the
natural order, and their attempts to embody such order in their social
arrangements? Even such an obvious subject as the influence of the
American revolution on our legal institutions has hardly been touched.
The history of technology opens up many broad questions which in-
volve the copious use of legal materials. The problem may be posed in
one form as that of the connection between man's control (or his sense
of control) over his environment, and his conception of the basis of the
institutions which are to control his society. Consider the view expressed
by the author of the Book of Job, in the words addressed to man by God
out of the whirlwind:
"Where is the way to the dwelling of light?
And as for darkness, where is the place thereof ...
Hast thou entered the treasuries of the snow,
Or hast thou seen the treasuries of the hail,
Which I have reserved against the time of trouble,
Against the day of battle and war?"
In contrast, what does it imply for legal institutions when men can say,
as did George Mead early in this century, "The human being as a social
form has actually got relatively complete control over his environ-
ment." Or, again, what has been the relation between the introduction
of steam power and the internal combustion engine, and man's concep-
tion of the ordering force in the Universe, and what is the relation, in
turn, between, this new concept of natural order and man's ideal of a
legal order?
A single example may illustrate the relation of the history of tech-
nology to the humane study of law. There remains to be written a
work of great significance on American civilization, taking as its point
of departure the history of the rise of the automobile. To such a study,
legal history would be an important if not the major contributor. Pro-
fessor Jerome Hall has already suggested one of the possibilities in rela-
tion to the law of larceny. But many other facets of American life,
thought and morals would be illuminated by readily available sources
on relevant aspects of the law of larceny, insurance, sales, suretyship,
and negligence-to mention only a few. Conceived in the proper spirit,
and written with a feeling for the broad problems, such a work could
tell us a great deal about the relation of technology to man; and specifi-
cally about the interrelations of technology and law with conceptions of
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standard of living and status, and moral, civil, and criminal responsi-
bility-in the largest sense about man's relation to a moral and legal
order as these develop in an industrial society.
Technology and ideas meet still'more obviously in a question like that
of the connections between a society's means of communication and its
concept of law. Here are vast unexplored possibilities. How do the
ways in which the decisions of courts and the discussions of lawyers are
communicated to the general public express or influence the views
which lawyers and laymen hold about the nature of law? Specifically,
compare the role of newspaper law-reporting in England with that of
the forum in classical Roman law. In the United States we see the
growth of law-reporting as a large-scale commercial enterprise (made
possible by the improvement of power-printing techniques and stimu-
lated by the invention of the key-number system of indexing) and the
wide dissemination of criminal trial-reports in the daily press. How do
these facts affect the concept of law held by both lawyers and laymen?
While lawyers find their way handily into the law by alphabetical in-
dices referring to such items as "fences," and "fish," many laymen
think of law mainly in relation to the courtroom drama of criminal
trials; legal principles and reasons become increasing inaccessible to
both lawyer and layman. What is the significance of such an emphasis
on the superficies of the law?
Even the so-called internal or conceptual development of legal insti-
tutions might be better understood if studied without preoccupation
with current legal practice or pressing social needs. Our understanding
of the roles in man's quest for law, of custom, statutes, case-law, and
of spiritual or moral sanctions is greatly deepened by such works as
McIlwain's High Court of Parliament; and the roles of bar, bench and
business community by such works as those of Morris, Dubois, Goebel,
and Livermore. Or, to take a more neglected question, what connection
is there between aesthetics, the desire for symmetry, neatness, or
beauty, and the actual development of legal ideas and institutions?
At first sight, the items in this miscellany may seem to have very
little in common. I think, however, that they do have something in
common which is of the greatest importance. They are not in the prag-
matic mood: they cannot be justified as contributing to immediate solu-
tions of problems of individual clients or of interest groups. Moreover,
they are all relevant to the study of man, to his quest for a moral, intel-
lectual and social order. They would all be likely to spring from a dis-
interested curiosity about man and his efforts to perfect his institutions.
Works of this type are not coming from our law schools or univer-
sities in any significant number. From our law schools there issues a
swelling flood of case-books and so-called "collections of cases and
materials," which add little of permanent significance and which usu-
ally do not outlive the generation of law students for which they are
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written. Occasionally, it is true, we do find a practising lawyer like
Albert Beveridge or Charles Warren, or a judge like Jerome Frank or
(still less frequently) a law professor like Karl Llewellyn, who allows
his mind to range freely and humanely over institutions, without crab
bed preoccupation with the uses of his writing. But, generally speaking,
the humanistic writings of such men are classified as the curiosae of
their careers, out of the main current of their thought. Meanwhile
many technically trained persons who are capable of humanistic studies
become popularizers rather than humanizers. Instead of contributing to
the permanent literature, they write vulgar narratives of the careers
of lawyers or of judges (so-called Lives of Great Lawyers), debunking
pamphlets on the legal profession or the idea of law, or handbooks which
oversimplify without explaining (Your Own Lawyer in 15 Minutes a
Day, etc.).
IV
At present few students are aware even of the possibility of human-
istic studies in the law. They are plunged from college, where legal insti-
tutions are virtually ignored, into law school where these institutions are
studied only from the pragmatic point of view. The disagreement among
their law professors mainly concerns the proper means of attaining the
pragmatic end. The alternatives presented to the brighter students
(assuming they are not interested in government service or in business)
are to practise law, or to teach in law schools; and even for the latter
the best preparation is practice. What is to happen to men who become
interested in the humane study of law?
In proportion as a literature of the subject actually develops in this
country, and as there appear more and more well-trained scholars com-
petent to excite the interests of others-as the paths are laid freely open
from law to philosophy, theology, anthropology, and history-finding
a career for such men will become less difficult. It is necessary now to
take practical steps in two directions: (a) to provide as many centers
as possible where mature scholars will be encouraged and given the
freedom to pursue the humane study of law; and (b) to provide many
other ways for stimulating the younger student's awareness of other
than pragmatic approaches to lgal studies. In this connection it is
urgent to find a place in universities where competent and industrious
students who wish to pursue programs of this kind may do so without
the rigidity of the law school curriculum, and yet actually receive de-
grees.
In the first place, there are even now a few scholars inlaw schoolsin
this country whose main interests are in the humane study of law.
Needless to say, their task is not to try to "reform" the curriculum of
the law school. Rather, they should seek in their writing and teaching
to become exemplars of the humane spirit in the study of the law. Such
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aw professors are in a position to take the lead in setting up broad and
flexible programs of graduate study (in cooperation with faculty mem-
bers outside the law school) which might provide a place of intellectual
refuge for students qualified for the type of study I have mentioned.
That such programs are practicable is demonstrated, for example,
by the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago.
This Committee offers an interdepartmental graduate program which
seeks among other objectives to encourage the study of all institutions
in the broadest context with no confining pragmatic emphasis. Similar
units elsewhere, bringing together historians, philosophers and social
scientists might help draw legal institutions into the main current of
our reflection. Such programs should, at least at the outset, be confined
to the ablest and most mature students. There should be a minimum
of prescription and of curricular apparatus, a maximum of personal
consultation of teacher and student. Because of the greater maturity
and competence demanded of these students, such programs have both
a special need and a special claim for fellowship funds.
Institutes and foundations of several types might serve the ends I
have described. The Foundation for Research in Legal History at
Columbia University, under the direction of Professor Julius Goebel, Jr.,
during its brief life has done valuable work. The Littleton-Griswold
Fund might look toward encouraging work of a broader nature. Still
other institutes or foundations might be helpful.
The great law libraries throughout the country should become centers
for such studies. Even a few sizeable fellowships for example, at Har-
yard, Yale, or at the University of Michigan, could do much in this way.
An important work remains to be done by the law department of the
Library of Congress. In the first place, of course, this department
should become one of the most active agencies in encouraging di-
rectly and indirectly the publication of now unpublished legal records
throughout the country. But more than that, it is the natural cross-
roads for legal scholarship of the most varied types. Substantial fellow-
ships there, either under Federal auspices or under a private foundation,
could do a great deal to advance studies in comparative law, jurispru-
dence, and legal history. 
I
A Journal of the Humane Study of Law, or a Journal of Legal His-
tory, though appearing only semi-annually, might be of great value.
There are, it is trpe, already too many law journals in this country. But
they are nearly all of a type: professionally centered, dominated by the
practical concerns of the law schools or the bar associations which
publish them. Such journals do, occasionally, publish articles of an
historical or general nature, but these are the garnish on the solid pro-
fessional dish; a spray of parsley and nothing more. Such a journal as
that proposed would seek to draw together important articles showing
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the wider significance of legal institutions and of concepts of law, and
to provide a focus and a forum for such studies.
We are often told that the disorganized condition of the documents
for the earliest period makes premature the writing of American legal
history on a large scale. ,7hile I cannot acquiesce in this view, I believe
that even those who hold it may see something in the final project which
I should like to propose. Obviously, the greatest stimulus to the type of
study I have been talking about would be the production of an Ameri-
can counterpart to the work of Maitland. But meanwhile we already
have the scholarly resources for a collaborative work which might at
once exemplify the broadest legal scholarship and encourage others to
significant writing. What I propose is a two or three volume collection
to be conceived unpretentiously as Essays in American Legal History or,
better, Legal Essays on American Civilization. The essays might be
grouped into three or four chronological sections. Each essay would be
contributed by a different person and related to his field of special com-
petence. Each author would in his own way seek to point outward in
many directions from the development of legal institutions to intellec-
tual, political, economic, and social history. Any such work, of course,
would have the virtues and vices of that variety of points of view which
characterizes all collections of this kind. The work as a whole would
not in any sense attempt to be complete, definitive, or exhaustive, but
rather would endeavor to explore, stimulate, and suggest-to provide
a rough preliminary map of some areas to be explored and some ways
of exploring. It would have the merit of drawing together as collabo-
rators, lawyers, judges, legal historians, intellectual historians, philos-
ophers, economic historians, anthropologists, and scholars in many
other fields. I think the value and the feasibility of such a work will
appear if we simply consider some possible contributions to the earliest
section, presumably on the colonial period. At the present time in this
country there are scholars of comietence and imagination who might
contribute essays on such topics as land tenure in early NewEngland
and its significance for political and economic life; the relation of the-
ology in Puritan New England to the theory of legislation and the
theory of society; Colonial criminal law and the problem of the recep-
tion of the common law; colonial education and the law; law and the
colonial village; the regulation of labor in the colonial economy; the
American Revolution and the law. There are analogous possibilities
for each of the later periods. Such a work could hardly help developing
among both its authors and its readers an interest of a wider sort in
American legal history; by bringing together illustrations of the work
already being done along these lines, it would offer an impressive ex-
ample of the manifold humanistic possibilities of legal scholarship.
Here might be a source for the infusion of a fresh spirit into contempor-
ary legal thinking.
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As a beginning, I propose that a group of us interested in encourag-
ing the kind of study I have proposed, constitute ourselves a small
informal committee to explore the above and any other ways of en-
couraging the study of law in the humane spirit.
V
The significance of the growth of such a spirit is in my opinion much
larger than its effect on legal scholarship. The future of our own society
and of the international community as well may depend on our success
in making real to literate classes everywhere, and not least in the United
States, the idea of law. This sense of the reality and significance of the
idea of law cannot stem from the notion that laws are nothing but
temporary expedients to serve the dominant interests of the strongest
in the domestic or the international community. It must come from
a deepening sense that the search for law is one of man's characteristi-
cally human needs; that it is intimately related to his whole thought,
experience, and nature; that legal systems and institutions are somehow
symptoms of man's attempt to embody in his social life a fragment of
a larger moral order, dimly seen, but transcending the interests of any
man or group of men.
Maine pointed out in his neglected work on International Law, that
the most potent force for the adoption of Roman law in medieval Eu-
rope was the opinion of the literate population, and that it was this
self-propagating power of an idea that disseminated international law
in its earliest stages. Our national history is full of paradoxes in this
regard: probably in the history of no other modern nation has a more
central place been given to the concept of natural law; yet no other
nation has been more easily seduced by legislative panaceas, or been
more positivistic or pragmatic in its temper. We have used the doctrine
of natural law throughout our history to help found and change our
institutions; at the same time, the spirit of our studies of institutions
has been essentially positivistic-closer that is to the spirit of Hobbes
and Bentham than to that of Locke and Blackstone. Bentham, as you
know, called the idea of natural law "nonsense on stilts;" Holmes, with
his customarily majestic condescension, likened it to the insistence of
the romantic knight that his lady-love be flattered with superlatives.
In the course of our history, we have appealed to the law of nature to
support our Declaration of Independence, to found our Constitution,
to preserve our union, to abolish slavery, and to support the Atlantic
Charter and the Four Freedoms, but our recent legal scholarship has
shown precious little concern or even respect for the natural law tradi-
tion. And especially within the last seventy-five years, during which
positivistic approaches have been impressively elaborated. This has
been in many ways unfortunate. For the concept of natural law did
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open and can still open the way from legal doctrine to the world of phi-
losophy, anthropology, history and everything else which may illumi-
nate man and his institutions.
Our recent preoccupation with the relation of law to the interests
(primarily the material interests) of individuals and groups has led us
to overlook the significance of legal institutions for the nature of man
and his quest for a moral order. Holmes' continuous concern with the
significance of institutions for "our friend the bad man" suggests the
narrowness of the pragmatic emphasis. "But what doesit mean to abad
man?" was Holmes' persistent question. However useful or necessary
such an approach may be in professional schools, it is only a partial
approach to legal institutions; nor need one be a devotee of natural law
philosophy to see its partiality. There is also the question "WNhat does
it mean to a good man?"-if any such there be. And even more impor-
tant, "What does it mean to a man?" The humane study of law would
at least try to bring the study of the legal past and present into rela-
tion with the whole human being, with his striving for a moral order
as well as his scramble to satisfy his material interests. In this way
such an approach (compared with the pragmatic view) would be at
once more objective (that is, more attentive to the whole man as he
actually is), and more normative, since it makes the study of law
more effectively a part of our quest for what is essentially human.
It would at the same time relax and enrich the intellectual atmosphere
in which legal institutions are to be studied-or even perhaps practised
-- and it would lead us freely into the neglected fields of comparative
law, into the past of many nations, and into the whole context, physical,
social and spiritual, of human life.
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